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ABSTRACT 
 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) has important applications such as remote environmental monitoring and 
target tracking. In addition, Wireless Sensor networks is an emerging technology and have great potential  
to be employed in critical situations like battlefields and commercial applications such as building, traffic 
surveillance, habitat monitoring and smart homes and many more scenarios. One of the major challenges 
wireless sensor networks face today is security. This has been enabled by the availability for a kind of 
possible attacks; the innate power and recall limit of sensor nodes earn customary security solutions 
unfeasible. These sensors are equipped with wireless interfaces with which they can communicate with one 
pther to form a network. In this paper we present a survey of security issues in WSNs, address the state of 
the art in research on sensor network security, and discuss some future directions for research. 
Keywords: Wireless Sensor Networks, Security Attack, Survey, Security. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The progression of low-cost, low power, 
multifunctional sensor nodes have been possible by 
developments in wireless communication and 
electronics. Deploy of Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSNs) is became possible by use of very small 
sensor nodes, made up of sensing, data processing, 
and communication parts, which show  a 
meaningful enhancement over conventional wired 
sensor networks. WSNs can extremely be used to 
make easier system design and operation to monitor 
the environment without need connection with 
wired networks. In many applications WSNs can be 
useful, as an example to find and follow the  
passage of armed force in war, to observe 
contaminants in environment [1]. 
Security should be considered because most of 
sensor networks possess various mission-critical 
tasks and therefore they need security [2]. 
Undesirable information leakage and preparation 
incorrect outcomes can be happened due to 
inappropriate use of information or using wrong 
information. There are significant differences which 
extremely influence how security is obtained, 
despite similarity of some characteristics of WSNs 
to conventional wireless ad hoc networks. Several 
diversity between nodes in sensor networks and 
nodes in ad hoc networks can be named including; 
the greater sensor node’s number in a sensor 
network in compared with the number of nodes in 
an ad hoc network, densely deployment of sensor 
nodes, tending of sensor nodes to failures due to 
rough environments and energy restrictions, 
regularly changes of the topology of a sensor 
network since of inability to success or mobility , 
limitation of sensor nodes in computation, memory, 
and power resources, and lack of global 
identification in sensor nodes. 
The way of implementation of secure data- 
transfer schemes in WSNs can be affected highly  
by these differences, for instance, WSNs could be 
more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks [3]. 
Because of the necessities of more complexity in 
design and greater using up of energy, advanced 
anti-jamming methods are not mostly possible in a 
sensor network [4]. In addition, the restricted  
energy   and   processing   power   of   nodes   cause 
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approximately impossibility in the use of public key 
cryptography. In spite of the probable achievability 
of public key cryptography in sensor networks 
through the outcomes from new researches [3, 4], it 
stays impossible for the most parts in wireless 
sensor networks. Instead, using of symmetric key 
cryptography is being possible in many security 
designs. The employment of keys in secure 
communication is a thing which needed in either 
case. 
In a network, straight pairwise key participating 
amongst each two nodes does not have same size in 
compare with large networks which have many 
nodes since of great needs of higher storage. In 
WSNs a security plan must prepare effective key 
distribution as preservation the capability to 
communicate among all related nodes. Also, secure 
routing protocols must be taken into account extra  
to key distribution. The way that a node transmit 
packet to other nodes is concerned in these 
protocols and a key difficulty is that of authenticat- 
ed broadcast. 
Public key cryptography is an important factor 
which existent authenticated broadcast techniques, 
most of the time depend on. In WSNs, these 
methods contain high computational overhead 
causing them impracticable. Secure routing 
protocols like SPINS [5] suggested for use in  
WSNs should take these factors into account. 
Moreover, data aggregation is required in WSNs 
since of energy restriction [6]. This aggregation of 
sensor data requires being secured so  that 
guarantees information integrity and confidentiality 
[7, 8]. 
Through cryptography, secure data aggregation is 
attainable; however the restrictions in wireless 
sensor networks and the special traits of the 
cryptography method and routing schemes must be 
considered by an aggregation design.  Being easily 
to change is too worthwhile for secure data 
aggregation protocols which permit less degrees of 
security for insignificant data, so preserving energy, 
and permitting greater degrees of security for much 
more important data, therefore higher energy 
consumption. It is worthwhile to have awareness of 
compromised nodes and attacks similar to any 
network. Numerous security plans grant protection 
so data stay undamaged and communication 
uninfluenced so little of them compromised  [9]. 
The capability of a nodes or distention to discover 
different compromised nodes allows them to do 
something, as well disregarding the reconfiguring 
the network to remove the danger. In the following 
part in more detail the mentioned fields and the way 
that these areas are all needed to make a perfect 
WSN security plan will discussed [8, 9, 10, 11]. 
 
This paper structure as follow: in section 2, we 
describe Constraints in Wireless Sensor Networks 
and security requirements in section 3. In section 4 
discuses about Security Goals and challenges on 
sensor networks in section 5. In section 6, discuses 
about attack on wireless sensor networks. The end 
section we show conclusion. 
 
2 CONSTRAINTS IN WSNS 
 
A great number of sensor nodes that are intrins- 
ically resource-restricted exist in wireless sensor 
network. These nodes have different characteristics 
such as limited processing ability, so little capacity 
storage, and limited communication bandwidth 
because of restricted power and size of the sensor 
nodes. Sometimes it is stiff to straight use the formal 
security technique in WSNs since of these restrict- 
ions. It is essential to be attentive of the restrictions 
of sensor nodes for optimization the routine security 
algorithms in WSNs [10]. Some of the main WSN 
limitations include energy limitations. In fact, the 
most important constraint for WSN is energy. 
Generally, there are several categorized parts for 
consumption of energy in sensor nodes; consuming 
energy and computation in microprocessor [11]. 
On the other hand, A WSN is susceptible to 
threats and risks, for example, an adversary can 
compromise a sensor, change the data integrity, 
snoop on messages, introduce wrong messages, and 
destroy network resource. Wireless nodes broadcast 
their messages to the medium differently from wired 
networks, so the security problems must be solved in 
WSNs. Some limitations are in uniting security into  
a WSN like storage restriction, communication, 
computation, and processing capabilities [20, 21]. 
Comprehension of these restrictions and attaining 
suitable performance with security measures to 
address the necessities of an application are 
requirements in security protocols of designing need. 
Several security proposals at various layers of the 
protocol stack are reviewed. 
 
3 SECURITY REQUIRMENT 
 
In making a plan for WSN protocols, the rough 
environments and the danger being require further 
particular security attention. Normally, several 
security services such as confidentiality, 
authenticity, integrity, availability, nonrepudiation, 
freshness, forward secrecy and backward secrecy 
must be supplied. 
a) Confidentiality: To keep the privacy of 
significant data transmitted among sensor nodes, 
confidentiality  is  a  fundamental  security  service. 
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Commonly, previously of the packet transferring 
from the sending node, important sections of a 
packet are encrypted and subsequently, at the node 
which received the packet, the sections are 
decrypted. Attackers are hindered of getting access 
at the important information, without the similar 
decryption keys. The applications determine the 
type of information which must be encrypted. 
Sometime data in packet encrypt or packet header 
encrypts to secure identity of node [12, 14]. 
b) Authenticity: For preparation the security of 
communicating node’s identities, authenticity is 
vital. Any node must verify even if an accepted 
message comes from a true sender. In the absence 
of authentication, attackers without difficulty are 
able to extend wrong data into the wireless sensor 
networks. Generally, for authentication the origin  
of a message, an annexed message authentication 
code possibly employed [13, 18]. 
c) Integrity: Integrity should be prepared to 
assure that attackers cannot change the transmitted 
messages. Attackers are able to establish 
interference packets to modify their polarities. In 
addition before forwarding them a malicious  
routing node can alter significant data in packets. 
To find random errors throughout packet 
transmissions as a cyclic redundancy checksum 
(CRC) employed for detecting them, similarly 
keyed checksum, for example a MAC use to secure 
packets against changes [12, 14, 15, 16, and 17]. 
d) Availability: Another significant capacity of 
a WSN giving services at any time they are needed 
is availability, anyway, attackers are able to activate 
attacks which reduce the performance of network or 
demolish the whole network. The most harmful 
danger to network availability is a denial of service 
[7]; it happens in situation that attackers, by  
sending radio interference, disrupting network 
protocols, or depleting the power of nodes through 
various tricky methods make the network unable to 
prepare services [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. 
 
4 SECURITY GOAL 
 
Since of nature of broadcast in transmission 
medium, restriction of resource on sensor  nodes 
and environments without control where they are 
deserted without any participant, wireless sensor 
networks are susceptible to several attacks. WSNs 
have the mentioned general security purposes 
similarly to other communication systems. In 
confidentiality, just to authorize parties, informa- 
tion is attainable to read. In authentication, the data 
is originating from an authorized party. If data was 
 
changed from the secure to the destination, it is 
detected in integrity. In non-repudiation, the sender 
and the receiver of massage do not have capability 
to reject the transmission. Just authorized parties 
can employ particular resources in access control. 
In availability, resources attainable to authorized 
parties [19, 20]. 
 
5 CHALENGES OF SENSOR NETWORK 
 
Preparing effective data aggregation, while 
protection privacy of data and integrity is a 
stimulating difficulty in wireless sensor networks 
since of the below factors: 
 
a. In WSN, trust management is difficult. Users  
in the wireless sensor networks are very keen  
to realize others’ personal information, and the 
communication is over public accessible 
wireless links, so the data collection is 
susceptible to attacks that endanger the  
privacy. The communication of privacy 
sensitive data over civilian wireless sensor 
networks is regarded unpractical, without 
suitable protection of privacy [21, 23]. 
 
b. During in-network aggregation, enemies can 
without difficulty change the intermediate 
aggregation outcomes and cause the final 
aggregation result deviate from the true value 
very much. Without security of data integrity, 
the data aggregation consequence is not 
reliable [22, 23]. 
c. Data collection over wireless sensor networks 
does not trust in dedicated infrastructure. In 
several situations, the number of nodes 
responding a question is not distinguished 
before the data aggregation is directed [17]. 
d. Resource restricted portable devices are not 
able to provide heavily computation and 
communication load. 
e. The necessity on exactness of information 
collection (i.e., aggregated result) causes the 
existing randomized privacy-preserving 
algorithms not appropriate. In addition to the 
mentioned factors, it is so difficult to secure 
privacy and integrity of data aggregation at the 
same time, since of typical privacy-preserving 
plans disqualify traffic peer monitoring  
process, which decrease the accessibility of 
information in a neighborhood to confirm data 
integrity [22, 24]. 
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6 ATTACKS ON WSN 
 
There are many reasons for importance of 
security in WSN. Firstly, Wireless networks have 
susceptibility to protection attacks since of the 
transmission medium broadcast nature. Additiona- 
lly, in many cases, nodes are located in a danger or 
risky environment. In this environment their 
physical safety is threatened and as a result wireless 
sensor networks have an extra safe susceptibility. 
[10]. 
 Denial of Service (DoS): Malicious activity 
causes Denial of Service. Through sending 
extra redundant packets, the easiest DoS attack 
attempts to use up the resources attainable to 
the victim node. As a result, it impedes legal 
users in network from gaining entrance to 
services or resources to which they are entitled 
DoS attack is intended to the adversary’s effort 
to corrupt or demolish a network, and 
additionally for all events that reduce a 
network’s ability to set up a service [33]. Many 
kinds of DoS attacks in various layers could be 
presented in wireless sensor networks as an 
example at physical layer the DoS attacks  
could be jamming and tampering. At link layer, 
crash, and feebleness, inequitable, at network 
layer, neglect and greed, homing, misdirection, 
black holes. Malicious flooding and DE 
synchronization cause attack at transport layer 
[24]. 
Table 1:  Denial-of-Service Defense in WSNS 
 
Network 
Layer 
Attack Defense 
  packet 
leashes by using 
geographic and 
temporal info 
 
Spoofed routing 
information & 
selective forwarding 
 
Egress filtering, 
authentication, 
monitoring 
 
Sybil 
 
Authorization, 
monitoring 
 
Sinkhole 
 
Redundancy 
 
Transport 
 
Flooding 
 
Client puzzles, Rate 
limitation 
 
 Wormhole attack: Low latency connection 
between two parts of a network over which an 
attacker replies network messages is a 
wormhole [25]. This connection could be 
accepted by a single node forwarding messages 
between two adjacent non neighboring nodes, 
or by a pair of nodes in distinctive parts of the 
network communicating with each other. The 
function of wormhole attack in network is 
exactly similar to sinkhole attack which attack 
node closing to base station. 
 Hello flood Attack: One of the easiest attacks  
in WSNs is Hello flood Attack, in which 
attacker broadcasts HELLO packets with great 
transmission power to sender or receiver. The 
nodes receiving the messages suppose that the 
sender node is nearest to them and sends 
packets by this node. Congestion happens in  
the network by this attack and it is a particular 
kind of DOS. To prevent Hello Flood attacks, 
blocking methods can be used [26]. 
 Sinkhole attacks: The purpose of adversary in 
a sinkhole attack is to tempt almost all the 
traffic from a special network by way of a 
compromised node, making a metaphorical 
sinkhole with the adversary at the base station 
[26]. Normally, by making a compromised 
node which appeared to be particularly 
interesting to encircling nodes concerning the 
routing algorithm, sinkhole attacks can act. 
Since of difficulty to confirm routing 
information which provided by a node, 
sinkhole attacks are difficult to counter. For 
instance, laptop-class adversary has a great 
power  radio  transmitter.  This  permits laptop- 
Network 
Layer 
Attack Defense 
 
 
 
Physical 
 
Jamming 
 
Spread-spectrum, 
priority 
Messages 
 
Tampering 
 
Tamper-proofing, 
hiding 
 
 
 
Data Link 
 
Collision 
 
Error-correcting code 
 
Exhaustion 
 
Rate limit 
 
Unfairness 
 
Small frames 
 
Network 
and 
Routing 
 
Black holes 
 
Authorization, 
monitoring, 
redundancy 
Hello Flood 
 
Authentication, 
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class adversary to supply a high-quality route 
by transmitting with adequate power to obtain  
a broad area of the network [26]. 
 Sybil attack: The definition of the Sybil attack 
is a situation that a node displays higher toward 
identity to the networks. Fault-tolerant plans, 
allocate storage, and network-topology are 
protocols and algorithms which easily 
influenced. A distributed storage plan, as an 
example, could trust in .There being three 
replicas of the similar data to obtain a produced 
level of superfluity. When a compromised node 
acts as two of the three nodes, employed 
algorithms could deduce that redundancy being 
performed, in spite of the fact it has not 
performed [26]. 
 Selective Forwarding: A routing node has a 
main liability which is forwarding packets. 
However, any packet could be dropped and 
other ones might be forwarded intentionally by 
a malicious node. An unsuccessful detection 
framework to recognize the selective 
forwarding attack is suggested by Wang et al. 
The number of packets which must forward 
should be same to the number of packets that it 
receives and it is supervised for a routing node. 
Every sensor node can act under a promiscuous 
manner in their framework therefore; it can 
overhear the transmission of neighboring 
nodes. The neighbor is able to cooperate with 
other neighbors of the suspected node, and a 
decision about the suspected node is created 
through gathering the ideas from the suspected 
node‘s neighbors, on the condition that a 
neighbor of a suspected node detects exceeding 
a specific threshold in the packet number  
which failed to forward by the suspected node 
[26]. 
 
7 CONCLUSION 
 
The demand for security in WSNs becomes more 
obvious during ability growth of WSNs and they  
are used much more, however, in WSNs the node 
nature causes limitations like restricted energy, 
capability of processing, and storage capacity. 
These restrictions create WSNs so distinctive from 
conventional ad hoc wireless networks. Specific 
methods and protocols have been advanced to  
utilize in WSNs. All of the mentioned security 
dangers including the Hello flood attack, wormhole 
attack, Sybil attack, sinkhole attack, offer one usual 
goal which is for compromising the integrity of the 
network they attack. 
 
The security of WSNs has become a major 
subject since of the different dangers appearing and 
the significance of data confidentiality, although in 
the past, there was a little concentration on WSNs 
security. There are several solutions to secure 
against all dangers, although some solutions have 
previously been suggested. In this article, we 
principally concentrate on the threats in WSN 
security and the abstract of the WSNs threats which 
influence various layers along with their defense 
techniques is presented. In recent times, in place of 
focusing on various layers, scientists are trying for 
integrated system for security mechanism. The  
most usual security danger in various layers and the 
most reasonable solution in this paper  are 
presented. 
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